My first reaction to the news of a nuclear deal with North Korea was that it was just more of the same: the triumph of hope over experience and another example of State Department weakness. When I thought about it some more, I came to the conclusion that it could actually be a good deal, not for the North Korean problem, but for the Iranian one.
Whatever you think about the war in Iraq, it has made our efforts to both disarm North Korea and deter Iran more difficult. The ultimate cause of that is general cravenness among our allies and outright hostility among our enemies, such as Russia. But the proximate cause is the difficulties we are facing in Iraq.
If we ink an agreement with North Korea, amid the multilateral setting of the six party talks, it demonstrates America's reasonableness and our willingness to work with partners. The canard that we are a unilateral, cowboy nation rushing to war against all enemies is proven false. This could strengthen our hand against Iran, which is the greater threat.
So, perhaps we caved a little to North Korea. Ultimately, it is in China's interest that North Korea be kept under wraps and not destabilize the region. If we have to go soft - temporarily - on the Korean peninsula so that we can go hard against Iran, maybe it's not the 1994-redux con job that it appears to be on its face. I don't know if that is what the State Department's intent was - I doubt they are that calculating or, frankly, competent - but it is an interesting way to think about it.




